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"From Talk to Change: The Test for President Obama’s Israel-Palestine Policy" by Peter Gruskin

Thursday, February 12, 2009

Palestine Center Brief No. 175

By Peter Gruskin*

Much has been said of the prospects for peace between Israel and the Palestinians under U.S. President Barack Obama's administration. Although it is too early to tell exactly how American policy will unfold, many are pessimistic given the ambiguous political circumstances, with the dominance of the right-wing in Israeli politics and the lack of clarity in Obama's declarations and moves, both as a candidate and in his short time in office. Optimists, on the other hand, consider an Obama administration the best chance for encouraging a peaceful resolution. They argue if anyone can break from the American record of unwavering commitment to Israel's policies, it is this president. This essay contends that the best test for how much change there is in U.S. policy is the extent to which American policymakers disagree with their Israeli counterparts.

On the Campaign Trail

Political commentators debated Barack Obama's past views on Israel-Palestine, mostly during the 2008 election. Many in the Republican Party, as well as some pro-Israel activists and pundits, feared that Obama was "anti-Israel" by virtue of his associations.¹ If they did not explicitly state this, they pointed to his alleged ties to "radicals" critical of America and Israel, such as William Ayers, Rashid Khalidi² and Reverend Jeremiah Wright. This was, of course, in the context of a heated presidential campaign. The Republican presidential candidate U.S. Senator John McCain, by and large, stayed away from such criticism in his public pronouncements.

These commentators may have been wrong to the extent that understanding the plight of the Palestinian people is not the same as being "anti-Israel." Regardless, there is evidence that Obama was cognizant of the Palestinian narrative. Ali Abunimah, co-editor of Electronic Intifada and a Palestine Center fellow, knew Obama from the activist scene in Chicago. He claims he spoke to Obama at a 2000 campaign fundraiser at which Obama called for an even-handed approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Obama also, according to Abunimah, went to a community fundraiser in 1998 at which Palestinian academic Edward Said was the keynote speaker.³ In college, Obama was a student of Professor Said at Columbia University.⁴

Indeed, Obama drew some political inspiration from leftist critics of U.S. foreign policy, such as the radical organizer Saul Alinsky,⁵ as well as from critics of Israel, such as the international financier George Soros. Some who knew Obama from his pre-Senate days claim that he was somewhat sympathetic to the Palestinians. One such person, Rabbi Arnold Jacob Wolf, claims that Obama used to be "on the line of Peace Now… He was a moderate peacenik [before getting further into politics]."⁶

One reason for the sustained speculation is the lack of clarity and consistency in Obama's positions and statements. In March 2007, the candidate told a small group in Iowa, "Nobody’s suffering more than the Palestinian people."⁷ This statement was later qualified⁸ just as he corrected his remark about Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem⁹ at a speech to AIPAC (The American Israel Public Affairs Committee) in June 2008. His public pronouncements in support of Israel's 2006 war against Lebanon¹⁰ and his statement that Israel's recent offensive in Gaza was self-defense demonstrated his vocal commitment to Israel. As a candidate, he sought to comfort pro-Israel voters and projected himself as a pro-Israel candidate. Yet, at the same time, he provided kernels of hope to those seeking a more honest and impartial American engagement in the region by speaking of the need for change generally in American foreign policy and promising to put Israel-Palestinian peace at the top of his agenda.

This triangulation led some Israel supporters to argue that he, as a candidate, was untrustworthy. For example, the former Israeli ambassador to the U.S., Danny Ayalon, wrote in an op-ed to the Jerusalem Post that Obama's candidacy was cause for "some degree of concern."¹¹

The triangulation did not just worry advocates for Israel. Many pro-Palestinian activists believed President Obama catered to the Israel lobby for electoral purposes and will most likely continue America's pro-Israel agenda. During his AIPAC speech, which many observed, he made no references to "settlements," "occupation" or "territorial compromise."¹² His repeated calls for a two-state solution have not impressed these critics, as presidents before him have said the same. President Obama recognizes, as he said in his interview with Al-Arabiya shortly after taking office, that he will be judged for his actions not his words.

Although there is a debate right now about U.S. policy towards Hamas, Obama's statements during the campaign did not give much hope to those who prefer a more realistic approach of engagement. He remarked on the campaign trail, while talking to a group of Palestinians, that the U.S. will never recognize winning Hamas candidates until the group renounces its mission to destroy Israel. Obama claims he told this to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in a 2006 meeting.¹³ In his January 2008 letter to UN ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, he expressed qualified support for the Israeli bombing of Gaza. He wrote, "Israel has the right to respond while seeking to minimize any impact on civilians."¹⁴ A perfect example of his attempt at balance is in this same letter: "We all are worried about the consequences of the blockade on Palestinian families. Nonetheless, we must understand why Israel is forced to do this."¹⁵

In Office

There is disagreement over whether President Obama is going to be even-handed and fair. The test is how hard Obama is going to push Israel on issues such as the settlements (whose expansion Israel sought to hide publicly), Palestinian control of East Jerusalem, the borders, a Palestinian unity government, the refugee quagmire and Palestinian sovereignty. For too long, American officials merely echoed Israeli positions. The extent of the difference between the Obama administration's policy and the next Israeli government will determine how much change there actually is.

Besides his well-publicized symbolic gestures--calling Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas first, appearing on Al-Arabiya and the $20 million in aid sent to the Gaza Strip--he took the bold step of naming George Mitchell as a Middle East envoy. While these moves certainly signal the potential for change, the question of how far the administration will confront the anti-peace agenda of certain prominent elements within Israel's political establishment, especially those most empowered by the recent election, is an open one.

Skeptics argue that even if he is serious about peacemaking, Obama will be constrained by the Israeli lobby. Pro-Israel lobby groups provided him over $110,000 from 2000 to June 2006 alone.¹⁶ Furthermore, he has chosen a rabidly pro-Israel Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, to oversee the implementation of his policies and to advise on political moves. His silence on the Gaza conflict before his inauguration was another hint. Despite the positive steps he took, he still affirms Israeli positions on the Gaza offensive and the cause of the conflict at-large; for instance, that Israel acts out of security and that Palestinian militants are the source of the current conflagration. Others argue that the two-state solution, the end goal President Obama has affirmed, is past its moment in history.

The more optimistic argue Obama has a firm understanding of the need for a constructive American approach and is just playing politics with rhetoric to appeal to pro-Israel sentiments. They think Obama will outreach to both sides and put the necessary pressure on Israel and the Palestinians in order to lessen the tensions between the two. They also argue that a negotiated settlement is necessary for American interests in the region and is thus inevitable. For holders of this view, any parties seeking a just resolution should embrace the Obama administration with hope, even if expectations are low.

Conclusion

As a candidate, Barack Obama used some degree of political triangulation to appear balanced yet sufficiently pro-Israel in order to sustain political support from an indispensable constituency and lobby network. Yet, in his first weeks in office, he made interesting and noteworthy moves that rub against his election rhetoric. However, none of them indicate a break from the traditional U.S.-Israel alliance, and we cannot expect such nudging anytime soon while Israel sorts out its ruling government coalition--one likely to be divided by partisanship--and the dust in recent Palestinian politics settles. Ultimately, the only way to prompt change will be if the United States confronts the most untenable of Israeli positions--something former President George W. Bush's administration never did. The challenge lies in the inescapable fact that many of those positions, including Israel's control over certain settlement blocs, use of collective punishment against Palestinians, construction of the Wall and denial of responsibility for the Palestinian refugee crisis, are orthodoxy in the dominant political persuasion of Israel.

For those who believe peace between Israel and the Palestinians is attainable, President Obama offers optimism. Even his symbolic acts suggest a marked departure from the Bush administration, which explicitly took the position that conditions are not optimal to negotiate with Palestinians. Still, the degree of change possible is limited by domestic political constraints as well as the abysmal state of affairs on the ground. This optimistic vision is incongruent with the sour pessimism on the ground, as Palestinians mourn the Gaza offensive and remain divided politically and Israel's anti-peace right dominates its politics and public opinion--increasingly pitting it against Obama's stated agenda.

Given the rightward trajectory in Israeli politics and the growing gap between the rhetoric of Obama and the Israeli right, the best measure of change will be how much actual tension arises between the American and Israeli positions. Resolving such disputes between traditionally close "allies" in a way that corrects the power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians will be crucial since that is the only way a just settlement can really be effected. Concretization of Palestinians' losses since 1993, when the peace process began, is simply no basis for peace. Only an insistent and tough approach towards Israel can bring about a solution along the lines Obama outlined.

*This brief was written by Palestine Center intern Peter Gruskin as part of his research project during the Spring 2009 Internship Program.

The views expressed within are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jerusalem Fund or its educational program, The Palestine Center. This brief maybe be used without permission if credit is given to the Center.
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¹Sammy Benoit, "An Election Plea To Those Who Love Israel," American Thinker, November 2, 2008, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2008/11/an_election_plea_to_those_who.html.
²Hilary Leila Krieger, "McCain camp pushes Obama-Khalidi ties," Jerusalem Post, October 29, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1225199601042.
³Ali Abunimah, "How Barack Obama learned to love Israel," The Electronic Intifada, March 4, 2007, http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article6619.shtml.
⁴Peter Wallsten, "Allies of Palestinians see a friend in Barack Obama," Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-obamamideast10apr10,0,5826085.story?page=2.
⁵Peter Slevin, "For Clinton and Obama, a Common Ideological Touchstone," Washington Post, March 25, 2007, A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/24/AR2007032401152.html.
⁶Larry Cohler-Esses, "Obama Pivots Away From Dovish Past," The Jewish Week, March 8, 2007 (accessed at http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article6640.shtml).
⁷Justin Elliott, "Obama's Israel Shuffle," Mother Jones, February 1, 2008, http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2008/01/obamas-israel-shuffle.html.
⁸A spokesman for Obama later said that it was Hamas who was causing the Palestinian people’s suffering; see "Obama under fire for comment on Palestinians," Associated Press, March 15, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17631015/.
⁹ http://blog.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/06/05/obama_backtracks_on_jerusalem.html.
¹⁰Larry Cohler-Esses, "Obama Pivots Away From Dovish Past," The Jewish Week, March 8, 2007 (accessed at http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article6640.shtml).
¹¹Shmuel Rosner, "Gaza overlooked by U.S. voters; economy dominates race," Ha’aretz, January 24, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/948037.html.
¹²Larry Cohler-Esses, "Obama Pivots Away From Dovish Past," The Jewish Week, March 8, 2007 (accessed at http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article6640.shtml).
^13"Transcript of remarks by Senator Barack Obama," AIPAC Policy Forum (Chicago, Illinois), March 2, 2007, http://www.aipac.org/Publications/SpeechesByPolicymakers/Barack_Obama_-_AIPAC_Policy_Forum_2007.pdf.
¹⁴Justin Elliott, "Obama's Israel Shuffle," Mother Jones, February 1, 2008, http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2008/01/obamas-israel-shuffle.html.
¹⁵Shmuel Rosner, "Gaza overlooked by U.S. voters; economy dominates race," Ha’aretz, January 24, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/rosnerBlog.jhtml?itemNo=947921&contrassID=25&subContrassID=0&sbSubContrassID=1&listSrc=Y&art=1.
¹⁶Larry Cohler-Esses, "Obama Pivots Away From Dovish Past," The Jewish Week, March 8, 2007 (accessed at http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article6640.shtml).