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A NATO-led Palestinian-Israeli Rapprochement? Following the Greco-Turkish Model

Friday, August 12, 2005

By Zachary Bernstein*

Overview: In the early 1950s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) welcomed long-standing rivals Greece and Turkey as members. Although the limits placed on NATO as a strict military alliance during the Cold War often prevented the organization from acting as a mediator, the substantial aid that Greece and Turkey received from the U.S. and NATO did much to temper disagreements between the Mediterranean states, preventing the escalation of tensions into open conflict on several occasions.

For Palestine and Israel, NATO has strategic leverage and can play a role in easing tensions. While the Greco-Turkish and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts differ significantly-notably Israel's illegal occupation of Palestine-there are many similarities that may be worth a second look: this article argues that by providing incentives for Israel's compliance with international law and by encouraging transparency and trust in defense planning, NATO could have a significant impact on the peace process in Israel/Palestine.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly's recent decision to grant Palestinians observer status in parliament demonstrates that the alliance is moving in that direction, and indicates that NATO may be willing to play a more active role in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict even before the creation of Palestinian state.

Palestine and Israel in the Greco-Turkish Context

There are clear differences between the Palestinian-Israeli and Greco-Turkish conflicts, most obviously that Greece and Turkey are sovereign states with full control over their own land, people and resources while Palestinians have been denied self-governance for generations. Nevertheless sufficient similarities exist to make a fruitful comparison. Like their Greek counterparts, Palestinians know only too well how the balance of power tips in favor of a neighboring state that has repeatedly used force to achieve territorial gains. Furthermore, both cases exemplify a lack of trust between the main actors. Past negotiations have made Palestinians suspicious of any promises made by Israel, and Israel's record of meeting its obligations under international law and signed agreements is poor. It is not clear that this will change in the foreseeable future, as Israel has given no indication of any plans to comply with international law by giving Palestinians sovereign control over the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, its "disengagement" plan notwithstanding. On the other hand, Palestinian officials do not successfully reign in militants. Like Greece and Turkey, this mutual mistrust makes progress difficult and hinders resolution.

Although the origins of Greco-Turkish tensions are hard to determine, animosity existed well before the emergence of the modern state system. Historian Amikam Nachmani argues that the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman army in 1453 was among the earliest defining moments in the Greek national consciousness. Similarly, many argue that the 1936 Arab revolt in Palestine helped to consolidate an explicit Palestinian identity. Fears of Turkish aggression were compounded following the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-22, in which Turkey's acquisition of Greek territory forced the state to absorb over one million Greek nationals expelled by the Turks.

The nationalism produced by the Greek expulsion is not dissimilar from the effects of the 1948 Nabka (catastrophe) in which Israel expanded the boundaries of its U.N. granted territory through force. Turkey's overwhelming population, military and economic superiority continue to stoke Greek apprehension for their Mediterranean neighbor and Greek leaders are ever-suspicious of what they see as Turkish desires to revive the Ottoman Empire, just as extreme Zionist designs for the creation of a 'Greater Israel' fuelled the Arab struggle against Israel. Greece and Turkey feud over control of Aegean Islands and natural resources just as Israel refuses to recognize Palestinian territorial claims in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Greco-Turkish tensions over territorial waters and air rights are similar to problems Israel and Palestine face over the same issues as, Israel denies Palestinians control over their own borders. Most importantly, Palestine and Israel are mutually distrustful of each other's intentions, making any coordinated moves towards resolution difficult.

NATO, the Greco-Turkish Conflict and Israeli-Palestinian Relations

With the rise of Cold War hostilities in the late 1940s, the United States and Western Europe became preoccupied with securing Western Europe from potential Soviet incursions. As a result, both Greece and Turkey came to be seen as critical to Western security due to their shared borders with the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe. For these reasons, Greece and Turkey were offered NATO membership in 1951 and 1952 respectively. Similarly, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has long been the focus of American strategic concerns. The recent shift in focus of American foreign policy from defending against international communism to a so-called "War on Terror" has only further heightened the importance of Israel and Palestine, in part because of the ways terrorist groups have manipulated Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory as a justification for their actions.

While there is much talk in the U.S. regarding Israel's importance in fighting terrorism, equal attention must be given to Palestine's potential in this regard. The recent Palestinian presidential and municipal elections demonstrate that the Palestinian state, as a secular democratic polity, could be a beacon of stability in the region serve as an example to neighboring governments. An end to the Israeli occupation would remove the roots of terrorism by undermining a primary battle cry of such terrorist organizations while lessening the popular resentment that make up their foundation.

Given the clear interest NATO allies have in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, NATO should begin talks with Israel and Palestine regarding membership. This would include discussions of direct military aid, training for troops and guarantees of international protection from outside attack. It is essential that they be jointly presented to both parties as democratically elected sovereign states, with the admission of one conditional upon the actions of the other, in order to ensure that NATO membership is being offered only as part of a general conflict resolution. This means that NATO would insist on full Israeli compliance with United Nations resolutions, including removing settlements and giving Palestinians sovereignty over their land, borders and resources. Palestine would have to maintain its secular democratic form of government and its commitments to control the use of arms by militant opposition groups.

To secure the success of this process, the United States would have to play a leading role by urging Israel to comply with NATO recommendations. Furthermore, the U.S. should make further aid to Israel contingent on the country's acceptance of NATO conditions, and aid packages should be delivered through the NATO infrastructure following Israeli compliance with international law. Without these strict conditions NATO would not have the necessary leverage to force both sides to honor their commitments, making resolution unattainable.

Why NATO, Why Now?

The profile and geographic focus of today's NATO contrasts greatly with the collective defense organization created in April 1949. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, which marked the end of the Cold War, ushered in a period of ideological and infrastructural reform within the Atlantic alliance as it searched for a new raison d''tre. Through a series of meetings and conferences among the member states, NATO revised its primary function from that of a simple collective defense organization to a broader security community concerned with promoting regional stability. As a result, NATO became engaged in regional military conflicts in the Balkans in 1995 and 1999 and has been actively expanding its membership into Eastern and South-Eastern Europe as a means of encouraging stability.

The changes made to NATO in recent years would allow it to act more effectively and decisively to promote peace between Israel and Palestine than it could for Greece and Turkey. During the Cold War NATO insisted on excessive neutrality when dealing with disputes among its members for fear that any action taken against one state might weaken NATO's anti-Soviet front. Today, NATO's mission is based on promoting regional stability within and near its borders. This allows NATO the freedom to take a stronger stance against one member for violating another's rights. Under this new mission, NATO could force Israel to comply with international law or risk losing both NATO's guarantee of collective defense as well as substantial aid and military packages from Western governments that inevitably come with membership. NATO could push for Israel's recognition of Palestine's legal borders, an end to any military incursions into Palestine territory, and a fair and equitable distribution of resources.

Instability in the Middle East, caused by a failure to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in a just and comprehensive manner, could have significant spillover effects for the North Atlantic community, particularly given the proximity of the dispute to NATO's southern border. NATO could therefore serve as a military watchdog, ensuring that Israel and Palestine follow through with their agreements and obligations. For Palestine, membership in NATO would guarantee a substantial influx of defense aid from the U.S. and others, giving the democratically elected government of Palestine the resources to maintain a true monopoly on the use of force within its borders. Through membership in NATO, Israel and Palestine would increase the transparency with which their security forces act, alleviating feelings of distrust on both sides and helping to maintain a lasting peace.

This information brief was written by Palestine Center intern Zachary Bernstein, a student at Georgetown University, as culmination of his research during the Summer 2005 Internship Program. The views expressed within are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jerusalem Fund or its educational program, The Palestine Center. This brief maybe be used without permission if credit is given to the Center.

Recommended Readings

Borowiec, Andrew. The Mediterranean Feud. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983.

Couloumbis, Theadore. A Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

Fraser, T. G. The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Second Edition. New York: Palgrace Macmillan, 2004.

Moustakis, Fotios. The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO. London: Frank Cass,
2003.

Nachmani, Amikam. Turkey: Facing a New Millennium, Coping with Intertwined Conflicts. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.

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