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The language that absolves Israel by Saree Makdisi
From time to time, the
Palestine Center distributes
articles it believes will enhance understanding
of the Palestinian political
reality. The following Op/Ed by Saree Makdisi
was published in the online
edition of the Los Angeles
Times on 19 June
2009. To view this article online, please go to
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-makdisi19-2009jun19,0,1505080.story.
The language that
absolves Israel
By Saree
Makdisi
On Sunday night, Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered a
speech that -- by categorically ruling out the
creation of a sovereign Palestinian state --
ought to have been seen as a mortal blow to the
quest for a two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
On Monday
morning, however, newspaper headlines across
the United States announced that Netanyahu had
endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state,
and the White House welcomed the speech as "an
important step forward."
Reality can be
so easily stood on its head when it comes to
Israel because the misreading of Israeli
declarations is a long-established practice
among commentators and journalists in the
United States.
In fact, a special
vocabulary has been developed for the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the United
States. It filters and structures the way in
which developing stories are misread here,
making it difficult for readers to fully grasp
the nature of those stories -- and maybe even
for journalists to think critically about what
they write.
The ultimate effect of this
special vocabulary is to make it possible for
Americans to accept and even endorse in Israel
what they would reject out of hand in any other
country.
Let me give a classic example.
In the U.S., discussion of Palestinian
politicians and political movements often
relies on a spectrum running from "extreme" to
"moderate." The latter sounds appealing; the
former clearly applies to those who must be --
must they not? -- beyond the pale. But hardly
anyone relying on such terms pauses to ask what
they mean. According to whose standard are
these manifestly subjective labels assigned?
Meanwhile, Israeli politicians are
labeled according to an altogether different
standard: They are "doves" or "hawks." Unlike
the terms reserved for Palestinians, there's
nothing inherently negative about either of
those avian terms.
So why is no
Palestinian leader referred to here as a
"hawk"? Why are Israeli politicians rarely
labeled "extremists"? Or, for that matter,
"militants"?
There are countless other
examples of these linguistic double standards.
American media outlets routinely use the
deracinating and deliberately obfuscating term
"Israeli Arabs" to refer to the Palestinian
citizens of Israel, despite the fact that they
call themselves -- and are -- Palestinian.
Similarly, Israeli housing units built
in the occupied territories in contravention of
international law are always called
"settlements" or even "neighborhoods" rather
than what they are: "colonies." That word may
be harsh on the ears, but it's far more
accurate ("a body of people who settle in a new
locality, forming a community subject to or
connected with their parent state").
These subtle distinctions make a huge
difference. Unconsciously absorbed, such terms
frame the way people and events are viewed.
When it comes to Israel, we seem to reach for a
dictionary that applies to no one else, to give
a pass to actions or statements that would be
condemned in any other quarter.
That's
what allowed Netanyahu to be congratulated for
endorsing a Palestinian "state," even though
the kind of entity he said Palestinians might
-- possibly -- be allowed to have would be
nothing of the kind.
Look up the word
"state" in the dictionary. You'll probably see
references to territorial integrity, power and
sovereignty. The entity that Netanyahu was
talking about on Sunday would lack all of those
constitutive features. A "state" without a
defined territory that is not allowed to
control its own borders or airspace and cannot
enter into treaties with other states is not a
state, any more than an apple is an orange or a
car an airplane. So how can leading American
newspapers say "Israeli Premier Backs State for
Palestinians," as the New York Times had it? Or
"Netanyahu relents on goal of two states," as
this paper put it?
Because a different
vocabulary applies.
Which is also what
kept Netanyahu's most extraordinary demand in
Sunday night's speech from raising eyebrows
here.
"The truth," he said, "is that in
the area of our homeland, in the heart of our
Jewish homeland, now lives a large population
of Palestinians."
In other words, as
Netanyahu repeatedly said, there is a Jewish
people; it has a homeland and hence a state. As
for the Palestinians, they are a collection --
not even a group -- of trespassers on Jewish
land. Netanyahu, of course, dismisses the fact
that they have a centuries-old competing
narrative of home attached to the same land, a
narrative worthy of recognition by
Israel.
On the contrary: The
Palestinians must, he said, accept that Israel
is the state of the Jewish people (this is a
relatively new Israeli demand, incidentally),
and they must do so on the understanding that
they are not entitled to the same rights. "We"
are a people, Netanyahu was saying; "they" are
merely a "population." "We" have a right to a
state -- a real state. "They" do not.
And the spokesman for our African
American president calls this "an important
step forward"?
In any other situation --
including our own country -- such a brutally
naked contrast between those who are taken to
have inherent rights and those who do not would
immediately be labeled as racist. Netanyahu,
though, is given a pass, not because most
Americans would knowingly endorse racism but
because, in this case, a special political
vocabulary kicks in that prevents them from
being able to recognize it for exactly what it
is.
Saree
Makdisi is a professor of English and
comparative literature at UCLA. He is the
author of, among other books, Palestine
Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation.
The views
expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect
those of The Jerusalem
Fund.