



INFORMATION BRIEF

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Political Discrimination Against Arab Citizens of Israel By Daniel Magalotti*

Overview: Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, a significant Arab minority has resided within the nation's borders. Although Arab-Israelis hold full citizenship and should theoretically be equal with Jewish citizens, discrimination against the Arab community has been historically prevalent, especially in the political arena. Recently, the rightward shift in Israeli politics towards leaders like Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has caused increasing intolerance towards Arab-Israelis, including a denial of collective rights and attempts to take away individual rights. Any solution to this problem must advocate for equality for Arabs as individuals and for the community as a whole.

Roots of the Conflict

At the end of the 1948 war, 150,000 Arabs found themselves within Israel's borders.¹ The Israeli government first acknowledged the Arab minority in its Proclamation of Independence on 14 May 1948, calling upon "members of the Arab nation, inhabitants of the state of Israel, to preserve the ways of peace" while guaranteeing Arabs "full and equal citizenship" and "representation in all [the nation's] bodies and institutions."² While in theory granting Arabs individual rights, the proclamation failed to give collective rights, an issue that is at the heart of the conflict today.

The core of the conflict between the Jewish majority and Arab minority is Israel's self-definition as a Jewish and democratic state. Aharon Barak, former president of the Supreme Court of Israel, has stated, "Our existence as a Jewish and democratic state, with non-Jewish minorities who deserve full equality, reflects our basic principles and values."³ To many, this would seem to be a contradiction as the democratic values would envision equal opportunities for all while maintaining Jewishness entails the supremacy of Jewish history and culture. However, Jewish leaders see no contradiction. Now, Israeli President Shimon Peres enunciated this view in 2001 with his assertion that "territorial compromise is absolutely necessary for maintaining a firm Jewish majority and hence a democracy in Israel."⁴ The "Jewish majority" and "democracy in Israel" have become inextricably linked as the definition of the state as Jewish and democratic has been ingrained into the minds of all Jewish-Israelis.

For Arabs, this notion of ethnic democracy has caused a crisis of identity. While committing themselves to the state of Israel, as defined by its institutions, the Arab minority cannot give its allegiance to the state's Jewish character. To recognize the state as Jewish would be to forfeit Arab culture and history. The Nakba and the colonial experience that the Arabs have endured over the past 61 years have caused Arabs to view the Jewish experiment in Israel in harsh terms.

Naturally flowing from this definition of Israel as a Jewish state is a preference for its Jewish citizens. Under Israeli law, only the "Jewish nationality" is recognized,⁵ giving benefits in numerous areas such as control of public land to the Jewish Agency and easily facilitated Jewish immigration from the diaspora through the Law of Return.

This discrimination has manifested itself in all aspects of life for non-Jewish citizens of Israel, especially Arabs. Culturally, economically, socially, linguistically and politically, Arabs find themselves in inferior positions when compared to Jewish citizens. For example, while 16

percent of Jews in Israel live below the poverty line, this figure is 50 percent for non-Jews.⁶ However, because Israel is a democratic state, theoretically the democratic process is an avenue open to the Arab minority to remedy this discrimination. Yet, in contrast to its claim to be a fully free democracy, Israel has long discriminated against its Arab citizens in the political sphere, a practice that has only deepened in recent years.

History of Arab Political Discrimination

In 1949, the Israeli government, fearing external invasion and internal uprising, formed a military government for Arabs restricting speech and movement. Arab citizens were given the right to vote but political activity was confined to two groups. The first group, the moderate camp, was led by Mapai, the leftist and leading Zionist party which would create separate lists for Arabs to stand for election, creating dependence on and support for Jewish parties. An example of this support is a Knesset motion to abolish the military government that failed by a single vote in 1963 in which two of the nays came from Arab members.⁷

The second group, the communist movement, used one list for Arabs and Jews. While Rakah,⁸ a leading communist party, attempted to distinctly define Arab-Israeli identity, it never called for self-determination for fear of angering the government. This call would come a few years later with al-Ard,⁹ though Israel's Supreme Court outlawed the party in 1964, claiming its principles contradicted the existence of the state.

After the end of the military government in 1966, Arabs asserted themselves more freely due to economic advancement and international recognition of the Palestinian cause. Indicative of this shift was Rakah's new platform, advocating Israeli-Arab self-determination and Nawwaf Masalha, a Mapai-affiliated politician, called in 1976 for the establishment of a Palestinian state.¹⁰ This newly found confidence changed voting patterns, with Rakah dominating elections in the late 1970s and early 1980s.¹¹ Jews were largely indifferent to Arab political participation in this period. Arab-Israelis had proven loyalty to the state and the reward was greater individual political rights.

The Oslo Accords dramatically changed the situation. The agreement, designed to give limited self-determination and eventually lead to final status negotiations for Palestinians living within the Occupied Territories, made no mention of Arab citizens of Israel. While Arab-Israelis had been told they were "to be the bridge with the Palestinian people and the bridge to the Arab world,"¹² in the words of Jafar Farrah, director of Mossawa Center, The Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel, the agreement left many with a feeling of exclusion from the state. Compounding this feeling was the enshrinement of the state of Israel as both Jewish and democratic in 1992.

Arab intellectuals responded with calls for recognition as a national minority, including introduction of the bill "Basic Law – The Arab Minority as a National Minority," by Azmi Bishara, an Arab Knesset Member (MK). Bishara also ran for Prime minister in 1999 but eventually endorsed Labor Party leader Ehud Barak, giving him 400,000 votes, 50,000 more than Barak's margin of victory.¹³ However, Barak formed a government with the orthodox Shas, rather than Arab parties, leading to a sense of abandonment by the government. In a 2001 survey, 83 percent of Arab-Israelis were dissatisfied with their ability to influence the government, with only 7.2 percent saying that the Knesset expressed their interests.¹⁴

Political rights for Arabs in Israel have improved over the past 60 years in many ways. Arab citizens no longer live under military government and, throughout the 1980s, Arab politicians could openly call for self-determination without being disqualified from elections. Furthermore, Arab parties and integrated Zionist parties are the norm, rather than the satellite lists that once controlled Arab leaders. However, even as individual rights were achieved, communal rights are now sought. The evolution of fight for Arab political equality has reached a critical apex with recent developments focused on recognition of Arab-Israelis as a national minority and the radicalization of Jewish politics.

Recent Developments

The outbreak of the 2000 Al-Aqsa *intifada* in the Occupied Territory caused a clear radicalization of both the Arab and Jewish communities within Israel. In solidarity with their Palestinian brethren, Arab-Israelis protested, clashing with police and Jewish-Israelis. The violence resulted in the deaths of one Jewish and twelve Arab citizens.¹⁵ Subsequently, the Or Commission was set up to investigate why the violence occurred within Israel.

Released in 2003, the Commission's findings, while focused on immediate causes of the violence, also noted entrenched discrimination against the Arab community. It stated that "Government handling of the Arab sector has been primarily neglectful and discriminatory," and noted, "evidence of distress included poverty, unemployment, a shortage of land, serious problems in the education system and substantially defective infrastructure."¹⁶

Recommendations by the Commission focused on closing budget gaps between Jewish and Arab municipalities and ending discriminatory land practices but it "did not take a stand on the various claims to grant collective rights to the Arab sector in several areas."¹⁷ Where the Commission did address the political environment, it argued that Arab political leaders did not focus their anger into "legitimate democratic channels,"¹⁸ even though these channels could not exist in a state in which questioning the nation's ethnic character would lead to one being called a traitor. The Commission backed down when it had the opportunity to endorse recognition of the Arab community as a national minority, though it is doubtful that this recognition would have been implemented, as few of the Committee's recommendations regarding Arab equality have been put into action.

Since the *intifada*, political discrimination against Arabs has grown in intensity, with the continued denial of collective rights and a new movement, fueled by the failure of the peace process and the ethnic conflict of the second *intifada*, which aims to curb individual freedoms. Leading this radicalized rightwing movement is Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman.

Lieberman, who was once a member of the racist Kach party,¹⁹ leads Yisrael Beiteinu,²⁰ which is now the third largest party in the Knesset, controlling fifteen seats and a number of influential ministries. The current trajectory points to a thriving future for Lieberman, with Yisrael Beiteinu sweeping high school polls taken before the 2009 elections.²¹ Lieberman and his party represent a growing trend in Israeli politics that seeks to isolate the Arab community. The party's platform for the 2009 elections states:

"Members of this minority [Arabs in Israel] are likely to serve as terrorist agents on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. Many have already made explicit their lack of loyalty to the state. This situation could potentially lead to the collapse of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and perhaps as an entity all together."²²

Lieberman has sought to delegitimize Arab MKs who had met with leaders of Hamas by stating, "The heads of the Nazi regime, along with their collaborators, were executed. I hope this will be the fate of the collaborators in [the Knesset]."²³ Lieberman made a similar statement in a *Washington Post* interview in which he stated his intention to "outlaw these parties [Arab parties that do not take a loyalty oath] and these political leaders."²⁴ Lieberman has masterfully used this rhetoric to incite conflict with the Arab community and gain votes from an increasingly radical Jewish voting population.

However, Lieberman is not alone in his racist comments. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, religious leader of Shas, stated in July 2001, "most people know that Arabs are snakes,"²⁵ and even then Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who refused to sit with Lieberman in a coalition, called on schoolchildren to tell Arab-Israelis that "Your national aspirations lie elsewhere."²⁶

At the heart of these anti-Arab sentiments is the proposition that Israel must be a Jewish state. When faced with the contradiction between democracy and Jewishness, Lieberman has asserted, “the Jewish and Zionist values are more important.”²⁷ The government apparently agrees with these sentiments, as Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, has said that it would “disrupt the activities of any groups that seek to change the Jewish or democratic character of Israel, even if they use democratic means.”²⁸ Lieberman and his allies seek to deny Arabs not only their rights as a community, but also their individual political rights, which are guaranteed by Israel’s commitment to democracy. They have attempted to use the courts and the Knesset in order to accomplish this goal.

Outlawing Arab political parties has long been in practice, as shown with al-Ard, but the number of attempts to use the courts to undermine Arab politicians has increased substantially as of late. The Mossawa Center reports that there have been 23 accounts of delegitimization of Arab political leaders in 2008, compared to only fifteen in 2007.²⁹ In 2006, Azmi Bishara was indicted by the Israeli attorney general for traveling to Syria.³⁰ This was the first time a sitting MK was put on trial for non-criminal activity. However, Bishara is not alone. Between 1999 and 2007, nine Arab MKs were interrogated by the Israeli security apparatus for allegedly inciting ethnic conflict and undermining the state. During the same period, not one Jewish MK was questioned.³¹ Finally, the Israeli Central Elections Committee has banned Arab parties from Knesset elections three times since the early 1990s, though the Supreme Court overturned the ban in the latest attempt, an effort led by Yisrael Beiteinu to outlaw the United Arab List-Ta’al and Balad.³²

Within the Knesset, Lieberman and his allies have introduced a number of bills that are discriminatory to the Arab population with twelve bills introduced in 2008 alone during which time Yisrael Beiteinu was not even a member of the government.³³ Legislation to ban remembrance of the Nakba was first introduced earlier this year. After a number of revisions to satisfy Labor MKs, the bill would withhold public funds from any state-supported institution that finances activities “rejecting Israel’s existence as the state of the Jewish people” and supporting “armed struggle or terrorist acts” against Israel.³⁴ The bill has made it through cabinet with only Agriculture Minister Salom Simhon (Labor) in opposition.³⁵ Avirima Golan, writing in *Ha’aretz*, has correctly concluded that the bill “has one goal, and one goal only: to provoke Arabs.”³⁶ Lieberman also wants to introduce what he calls “responsible citizenship,” requiring all citizens to swear loyalty to Israel as a Jewish state to retain their citizenship. Aryeh Eldad, of the National Union Party, has introduced legislation to this effect.³⁷ Yisrael Beiteinu hopes that by provoking the Arab community there will be a greater public backlash against Arab-Israelis, making Lieberman more popular as his image feeds on ethnic tension.

While these attempts to restrict Arab political rights have taken place, the Jewish left has remained silent. Lieberman’s proposal for population transfer of Arabs to a future Palestinian state was “met with booing and catcalls” in 2004,³⁸ but Yisrael Beiteinu is now the second largest party in the coalition which includes Labor, once Lieberman’s sworn enemy. Left-wing Jewish politicians have continually cared more about their political survival than ideological considerations. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert brought Lieberman into his coalition to avoid early elections and former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni found it more politically expedient to face the voters than to allow Arabs to sit in her government in late 2008.³⁹

Arab-Israelis’ response has been to withdraw from the political system. Support of Arab and Arab-Jewish parties for the Knesset was 69 percent in 2003, 72 percent in 2006 and 83 percent in 2009, with turnout in 2009 at a record low 54 percent.⁴⁰ Arab politicians like Azmi Bishara have attempted to defend Arabs’ political rights but the overwhelming presence of anti-Arab leaders in the government has made this difficult. With Lieberman and his allies now in the mainstream of Israeli politics, Arab public opinion has come to fit the stereotype that Lieberman has sought to impose. For example, Holocaust denial among Arab-Israelis is now 40 percent, up from 28 percent in 2006.⁴¹ These views must be condemned, but as Arabs see their own government turn against them, the natural reaction is turn against the people in charge, which reinforces Lieberman’s anti-Arab rhetoric. As Fareed Zakaria, editor of *Newsweek*, has written, “It’s a

dangerous spiral: the worse the distrust gets, the less loyalty Israel's Arabs feel toward their country – and vice versa."⁴²

Proposals

As radicals like Lieberman dominate Israeli politics, Arab-Israelis can no longer rely on a *de facto* coalition with the moderate Zionists to achieve their goals. Instead, the Arab minority must look inward for support in its struggle for political rights. The "Future Vision" documents, a group of four proposals, are a good starting point for this discussion. The main document, "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel," published by Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, calls for official recognition of Arabs in Israel as a national minority with communal rights and the establishment of a "consociational democracy" in which each ethnic group would have the ability to veto decisions that undermine a group's culture or narrative.⁴³ The idea of creating a true democracy in Israel, with equal rights not only for individuals but also for major ethnic groups, must be incorporated into any comprehensive approach for ensuring equal political rights for the Arab community. The criticism of many Israeli political radicals, like Lieberman, is that by making Israel a non-ethnic state, the Palestinians would essentially be given one and a half states while Israelis would only have half a state, as it is presumed that a future Palestine would also be an ethnic state. To combat this misconception, Israeli-Arabs should ally with Palestinians in the Occupied Territory in calling for both states to be non-ethnic. While Palestine can fulfill the national aspirations of the Palestinian people and Israel for the Jewish people, both states should give equal individual and collective rights to minorities, mirroring the original United Nations partition plan. Salam Fayyad, prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, has already put forward this idea with his recent statement that Jews in a future Palestinian state will face "no discrimination, whatsoever, on any basis."⁴⁴ Two states, living side-by-side with equal individual rights for all and communal rights for minorities are not only the solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict but facilitate the goal of political and collective equality for Arab citizens of Israel.

Some of the "Future Vision" documents, however, go even further in calling for an official apology for the Nakba, recognition of Zionism as a colonial experience for Arabs and the creation of new national symbols. These demands share similarities with Lieberman's call for the revocation of citizenship if one does not agree with the Zionist ideals. Arab leaders would go down the same path if they believe that recognition of Zionism as a colonial experience or an official apology for the Nakba is essential to achieving equal rights. Atrocities have been committed on both sides, and these need to be acknowledged and even apologized for, but forcing an apology will only cause further tensions between Jews and Arabs. Arabs must proudly project their historical narrative, including highlighting the atrocities of the Nakba, but they should not seek to impose their narrative onto Israel's Jewish citizens, just as many Jews have done to the Arabs.

However, achieving collective rights will not be an easy task. Most of the Jewish-Israeli political establishment is opposed to this ideal. Arab-Israelis can employ two tactics to attain their rights as a community. First, they should demand that Jewish politicians live up to their promises, and second, an alliance should be created with Israel's international supporters.

While persuading Jewish politicians is important, outside pressure, such as allying with global supporters of Israel, is a more effective means of achieving political equality. Generally, any Arab attempt to pressure a Zionist party is met with resistance from the Jewish electorate and inflames ethnic tensions due to the staunchly negative views of Arab-Israelis by Jews. However, Arabs should not make the situation worse by reverting to fear tactics such as using the threat of demography. This will only make Lieberman and his arguments for population transfer and a loyalty oath more popular within Israel.

In contrast to Jews in Israel, Israel's international allies, including Jewish groups in the United States, uphold the necessity that Israel must be a democracy more than Lieberman and his allies. Ehud Olmert even noted that the "Jewish organizations, which were our power base in America,

will be the first to come out against us because they will say they cannot support a state that does not support democracy and equal voting rights for all its residents."⁴⁵ Arab leaders, in Israel and around the world, should highlight the wrongs committed by the Israeli government in refusing to grant equal political rights, both individual and collective, to full citizens of Israel who have lived there for generations.

More important than either of these two strategies, however, is the need for solidarity. Arab-Israelis must stay united in their struggle for collective rights and political equality. This does not mean that political competition within the Arab community should cease to exist. On the contrary, competitive elections will only underline the commitment to democracy. However, all Arab parties and leaders must continually and consistently remind both their own constituents and Jewish-Israelis that the dichotomy of Jewishness and democracy cannot continue indefinitely without one taking hold.

** This information brief was written by Palestine Center intern Daniel Magalotti, a student at George Washington University, as culmination of his research during the Summer 2009 Internship Program. The views expressed within are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jerusalem Fund or its educational program, The Palestine Center. This brief may be used without permission if credit is given to the Center.*

¹ Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 160. This was at least in part due to Israel's demand to much of the Galilee region under the Rhodes Agreement

² Elie Rekhess, "The Evolvement of an Arab-Palestinian National Minority in Israel," *Israel Studies* 12 (Fall 2007): 4.

³ Oren Yiftachel, "The Shrinking Space of Citizenship: Ethnocentric Politics in Israel," *Middle East Report*, no. 223 (Summer 2002): 39.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁵ Joseph Schechla, "The Invisible People Come to Light: Israel's 'Internally Displaced' and the 'Unrecognized Villages,'" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31 (Autumn 2001): 26.

⁶ Ali Abunimah, "Anti-Arab Racism and Incitement in Israel" (Washington: Palestine Center, March 25, 2008).

⁷ *Ibid.*, 167.

⁸ Hebrew acronym for "The New Communist List."

⁹ Meaning "The Land" in Arabic.

¹⁰ Rekhess, "The Evolvement..." 8.

¹¹ While the Mapai and Labor alliance drew 40 percent of the Arab vote in 1969, this was down to 13 percent in 1981 and gone by 1984. Rakah gained 51 percent of Arab votes in the 1977 elections.¹¹ In the 1980s, Zionist parties again gained some strength among Arab voters, but this was primarily because more liberal parties, such as Labor, allowed Arabs on their own lists, a step towards further political equality. (Rekhess, "The Evolvement..." 10.)

¹² Jafar Farrah, Mary Totry, and Khaled Furani, "Building Palestinian civil Society within Challenging Realities" (lecture, Palestine Center, Washington, DC, May 12, 2009).

¹³ The Mossawa Center, *The Palestinian Arab Minority and the 2009 Israeli Elections (March 2009 Update)* (Haifa: The Mossawa Center, March 2009).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ The official summation of the Or Commission report," *Ha'aretz*, January 9, 2003, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=335594> (accessed July 15, 2009).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ "Israeli settler to be appointed foreign minister under Netanyahu," *Maan News Agency*, March 16, 2009, <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=209245&MARK=lieberman> (accessed June 17, 2009). The Kach party is considered a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, Canada, and the European Union.

- ²⁰ Meaning "Israel Is Our Home" in Hebrew.
- ²¹ M.J. Rosenberg, "The rise of Avigdor Lieberman," *Los Angeles Times*, February 11, 2009, <http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-oe-rosenberg11-2009feb11,0,5037251.story> (accessed June 16, 2009).
- ²² Yisrael Beytenu, *Yisrael Beytenu's Vision*, <http://www.beytenu.org/107/1172/article.html>
- ²³ "Lieberman calls Arab MKs who meet with Hamas 'collaborators,'" *Jerusalem Post*, May 4, 2006, <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1145961280390> (accessed June 16, 2009). Labor MK Eitan Cabel said that the time, "His perspective is racist. I will do everything I can to make sure he isn't in the next government." Of course, Lieberman did end up in the next government, and the one after that.
- ²⁴ "A Conversation With Avigdor Lieberman," *The Washington Post*, March 1, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/26/AR2009022602806.html> (accessed June 16, 2009).
- ²⁵ Yiftachel, "The Shrinking Space of Citizenship..." 40.
- ²⁶ "Livni sparks Arab 'transfer' row," *BBC News*, December 12, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7779087.stm (accessed July 31, 2009).
- ²⁷ Ali Abunimah, "World silent as fascists join Israeli government," *The Electronic Intifada*, October 24, 2006, <http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article5874.shtml> (accessed June 17, 2009).
- ²⁸ Abunimah, *Anti-Arab Racism...*
- ²⁹ The Mossawa Center, *Main Findings of the Mossawa Center's Racism Report 2009* (Haifa: The Mossawa Center, March 2009).
- ³⁰ Yiftachel, "The Shrinking Space of Citizenship..." 40.
- ³¹ The Mossawa Center, *The Palestinian Arab Minority...*
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ The Mossawa Center, *Main Findings...*
- ³⁴ Reuters, "Bill outlawing anti-Israel protest near approval," *Reuters*, July 19, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLJ587076> (accessed July 20, 2009).
- ³⁵ "Labor Min. to Lieberman: Nakba bill sullies Israel's image," *Ha'aretz*, July 19, 2009, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/11012080.html> (accessed July 20, 2009).
- ³⁶ Avirama Golan, "Forcing Arabs to study Zionism is no solution," *Ha'aretz*, June 18, 2009, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1093587.html> (accessed June 17, 2009).
- ³⁷ The Mossawa Center, *The Palestinian Arab Minority...*
- ³⁸ Jennie Rothenberg Gritz, "Israel Is Our Home," *The Atlantic*, March 14, 2007, <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200704u/avigdor-lieberman> (accessed June 16, 2009).
- ³⁹ According to the 2007 Israeli Democracy Index poll by the Israel Democracy Institute, 78 percent of Israeli Jews oppose Arab parties or ministers joining the government (Ali Abunimah, *Anti-Arab Racism and Incitement in Israel* (Washington: Palestine Center, March 25, 2008).)
- ⁴⁰ The Mossawa Center, *The Palestinian Arab Minority and the 2009 Israeli Elections (March 2009 Update)* (Haifa: The Mossawa Center, March 2009).
- ⁴¹ According to a recent Haifa University survey. The proportion of Arab-Israelis recognizing Israel's right to exist has also dropped, from 81 percent in 2003 to 53 percent today. From, "Israeli Arabs defiant on 'loyalty laws' plan," *BBC News*, May 31, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8073752.stm (accessed July 15, 2009).
- ⁴² Fareed Zakaria, "Israel's Biggest Danger," *Newsweek*, February 23, 2009, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/184765> (accessed June 16, 2009).
- ⁴³ Rekhess, "The Evolvement..."
- ⁴⁴ "Fayad: Jews welcome in our future state," *Jerusalem Post*, July 5, 2009, <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1246443725800&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull> (accessed July 17, 2009).
- ⁴⁵ Aluf Benn, David Landau, Barak Ravid and Shmuel Rosner, "Olmert to Haaretz: Two-state solution, or Israel is done for," *Ha'aretz*, November 29, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/929439.html> (accessed July 27, 2009).