Despite the somewhat encouraging statements from the Bush administration demonstrating its support for a Palestinian state and its opposition to Israeli settlement activity, University of Virginia Vice Provost for International Affairs William Quandt argued that the administration has yet to adopt an evenhanded and balanced policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Speaking at a special Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine (Palestine Center) series entitled “In Focus: Examining U.S. Policies, Strategies, and Objectives in the Middle East” on 20 June 2002, Quandt argued that the Bush administration has so far “tipped very heavily in the direction of [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon and his government.”

Quandt’s comments come at a time when U.S. President George W. Bush is preparing to announce his new vision for Middle East peacemaking. However, Quandt doubts that the Bush administration is on the verge of “articulating a serious and new approach” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What is needed, in Quandt’s opinion, is an approach that would reverse the cycle of violence on both sides and move the region back to negotiations.

“I am afraid we are at one of those moments when the stakes are extremely high and the situation is grim. The stakes are high in terms of what Washington chooses to do in the very near future,” Quandt said.

Quandt believes the Bush administration will not propose anything new or substantial. He predicted that the much anticipated Bush proposal will have no strategy behind it and will be nothing that the United States would put its “weight, determination, or muscle” behind. “It will be a speech that ends up annoying or disappointing most people who care about these issues,” Quandt said.

Quandt outlined what he believed would be a serious U.S. foreign policy statement. One important theme would be a call for an early end to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Quandt argued that an end to occupation conveys more “action” than the establishment of the provisional Palestinian state that Bush is expected to announce, pointing out that the meaning of a state can be “trivialized,” while ending the occupation has real content.

It is important, argued Quandt, that the United States reiterate its support for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A serious statement must address the issue of settlements. The U.S. statement should say that in a final peace agreement, settlements would be removed or consolidated within limited areas. Until final peace is reached, incentives should be put in place to lure settlers out of the settlements. On the issue of the Palestinian right of return, Quandt believes the United States should not support an unrestricted right of return to Israel, but rather a right of return to a Palestinian state and generous compensation. Jerusalem, Quandt argued, should be the capital of two states, but it should remain an open city. He said the United States must drop the demand for Palestinian reform, arguing that it is an internal Palestinian issue.

Quandt argued in favor of “strong presidential action” in dealing with the conflict. He said the United States should put on record a set of principles it is willing to defend. Quandt believes this would “signal” to Israelis that Sharon is not a leader who can deal with the United States. A strong stand by the United States would energize the political process in Israel and in Palestine, easing the way for new leadership on both sides. To prove he is serious, Bush should appoint former Secretary of State James Baker, who Quandt described as “a tough man with extensive knowledge of the issues and players,” as his Middle East envoy.

However, Quandt is certain the Bush administration will never issue such a statement. President Bush has a mindset that is “predisposed to see Israel in a favorable light.” His knowledge of the Middle East is limited to a trip he made to Israel—hosted by Sharon—before he became president. Bush’s key advisors hold strong views in favor of Israel, so Bush hears a “one-sided” view of the conflict. Quandt attributes Bush’s hands-off approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a result of the failure of the Clinton administration in trying to secure a peace agreement. The Clinton administration made it clear—and the Bush administration listened—that Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat was not to be trusted. Quandt believes Bush decided not to “throw his prestige” into something the previous administration labeled a “loser issue.”

Domestic political concerns also play a role in Bush’s approach to the conflict. As a president who was “barely elected,” Bush will not do anything that could offend potential voters or upset the Congress.

Sharon played a major role in shaping Bush’s attitude toward Arafat and the conflict. Sharon, explained Quandt, has succeeded in convincing Bush that Arafat is not a fit partner for peace. Sharon has also succeeded, to a large extent, in convincing Bush to adopt Israel’s definition of the issues in the region and of what the conflict is about, adding that Bush’s call for Palestinian reform is another example of how he identifies with the Israeli agenda.

The above text is based on remarks delivered on 20 June 2002 by William Quandt. The speaker’s views do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine (Palestine Center) or The Jerusalem Fund. This “For the Record” may be used without permission but with proper attribution to Palestine Center. To contact Quandt, write to quandt@virginia.edu.

This information first appeared in “For the Record” No. 118, 21 June 2002.