Post-incursion Strategy:

The Israeli government believes it has defeated the Palestinians. What is left is to construct a type of rule that leaves Israel in control of Jerusalem and the West Bank—its settlement network intact—yet relieves it of direct rule over the territories’ three million Palestinians. To make this palatable to the international community, Sharon must offer a sop to the notion of Palestinian self-determination. The outlines of such an ambitious plan are already taking shape on the ground. Its main outlines have been announced by the Israeli army, a characteristic of the intimate involvement of the military in the formulation of Israeli political policy. Although it has many “wrinkles,” the emerging post-incursion strategy has three main components:

1. “Separation.” On the surface, the notion of “separation” seems to be an innocent security measure. It involves the construction of a massive “buffer zone” extending along the Green Line some 10-20 kilometers into Palestinian territory. Israel is erecting a formidable maze of concrete walls and barricades, trenches, canals, electric and barbed-wire fences, bunkers, guard towers, surveillance cameras, security crossings, and platforms. While it has a security side, separation is intended to delineate the areas of the West Bank that Israel wishes to claim. It eliminates the possibility that the thick corridor between the Ariel settlement bloc in the northern West Bank and Greater Jerusalem will be relinquished to the Palestinians as envisioned in former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s plan. It places the large settlements in the western part of the West Bank irreversibly within the de facto border created by the security installations, including East Jerusalem which has been “isolated” from the West Bank. “Separation” is a mechanism for the annexation of about 15 percent of the West Bank under the guise of “security,” effectively removing it from any negotiations. The militarized “buffer zone” is only one component of a wider system of absorption, including the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway and “bypass” highways that link Israel to the settlements.
2. “Cantonization.” One of the most dramatic outcomes of the Israeli incursion into the West Bank is the nullification of Areas A, B, and C, fundamental components of the Oslo Accords. A new, more rational form of control is emerging, one that institutionalizes the siege on Palestinian cities and turns it into a permanent administrative arrangement. The extraterritorial status of Areas A and B—supposedly under Palestinian civil jurisdiction—has effectively ended. Areas A and B will be replaced by a more constricting system of cantons, euphemistically and misleadingly called “security zones” in Israeli parlance. The West Bank will be carved into eight zones structured around the major West Bank cities: Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Ramallah, Jericho, Bethlehem, and Hebron. The Gaza Strip will be divided into three zones. Besides restrictions on the movement of people, Palestinian cargo will be transferred “back-to-back” to Israeli trucks at platforms strategically located between Palestinian cities and re-transferred to Palestinian vehicles for transport to Palestinian destinations. This means cargo traveling between Hebron and Jenin will be loaded and unloaded five or six times. Not only does this violate international law guaranteeing freedom of movement in occupied territories, but it is also a devastating blow to the virtually moribund Palestinian commerce. These restrictions mirror South Africa’s notorious “pass laws.” Palestinian residents will need permits issued by the civil administration, Israel’s military government, for travel between cities and cantons within the West Bank and Gaza. These permits will be valid for specified hours, 5 a.m. to 7 p.m., and must be renewed monthly. Like the South African “passbooks,” these internal permits imprison Palestinian residents within their tiny cantons. Tightening the already strangling closure, the Civil Administration announced that Palestinian residents of Areas A and B will be denied all entry to Israel, including East Jerusalem.
3. “Settlement and Israel-Only Highway Expansion.” In addition to military and administrative measures, Israel has relied on “creating facts on the ground” to make its presence in the Occupied Territories irreversible, and to neutralize any attempt to wrest control from it. Simultaneous to its cantonization plan, Israel publicly announced its intention to build 957 units in West Bank settlements, most in the “Greater Jerusalem” area. The timing and the casual, almost contemptuous, way it was announced—when the international community is working to freeze settlement construction under the Tenet plan—indicates the degree to which Israel feels its actions are beyond international control. Likewise, Israel’s construction of a 480 kilometer system of “bypass” highways linking settlements to Israel while creating additional barriers to Palestinian movement continues unabated.

Sharon’s Grand Scheme:

Since the Palestinians have been, in Sharon’s view, permanently defeated, there is no need to give lip service to the limited independence envisioned for the Palestinians in the Oslo “peace process.” The ongoing incursions have destroyed Oslo—a key goal of Sharon and his predecessor and likely successor former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. We are back to the “autonomy” formulated by Sharon’s mentor, former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who in 1981 established the Israeli Civil Administration and in 1982 invaded Lebanon to crush the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). As for the Palestinians, they will have to choose between incarceration and transfer. Sharon’s grand scheme, until a Palestinian state emerges in Jordan and Palestinians are transferred there, is emerging “on the ground” as follows: the West Bank will be divided into three or four separate cantons according to settlement blocs and Israeli highways already in place. A northern canton would be created around Nablus, a central one around Ramallah, and a southern one in the area of Hebron, with a possible separation of Qalqilya and Tulkarem from the rest. Each would be disconnected from the other, but independently connected to Israel. A road or two might connect the different cantons, with checkpoints and cargo docks ensuring Israel’s complete control. Each canton would be granted local autonomy under the supervision of the civil authority.

Since the international community would demand a sop to Palestinian self-determination, Gaza will become the Palestinian state, probably when Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat is gone and a more compliant leader can be found to sign off on such an arrangement. If hard pressed, Israel could upgrade the status of the Palestinians in the West Bank from “residents of autonomous cantons” to Palestinian “citizens” without endangering its control.

Does Israel really believe this scenario is possible, that the Palestinians will submit to a truncated set of autonomous islands instead of a viable and truly sovereign state? Yes. Given the state of international response, Israel sees little opposition to this arrangement provided it can maintain an “industrial quiet” that will allow the U.S., Europe, and the Arab states to get on with their particular agendas. Besides some discordant noises coming from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), some churches, and the Muslim community abroad, the international community has proven extremely compliant. Incarceration, and eventually transfer, seems eminently plausible to Sharon and his colleagues. Despite protestations by Sharon, the 12 May 2002 vote by acclamation of the Likud Central Committee against the establishment of any Palestinian state flowed logically and smoothly from “Operation Defensive Shield.”

Jeff Halper is the Coordinator of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the Palestine Center (Palestine Center). This Information Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund. The author can be reached at icahd@zahav.net.il.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 92, 29 May 2002.