For more than half a century, Palestinian refugees have waited to go home. Today, a resolution of their plight seems as distant as ever. What progress was made on the refugee issue during Palestinian-Israeli permanent status negotiations from Camp David in July 2000 to Taba in January 2001? How have the prospects for a refugee agreement been altered by the al-Aqsa intifada, with the election of the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and by other developments?

Rex Brynen, associate professor of Political Science at McGill University in Montreal, Canada and coordinator of Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet (wwww.prrn.org), addressed these and other issues at a Palestine Center (Palestine Center) luncheon briefing on 22 February 2002.

He began by outlining the Israeli and Palestinian positions on the issue as of the most recent bilateral negotiations at Taba, in January of 2001. Contrary to persistent media reports that “the refugee issue was an enormous unresolved obstacle,” the negotiators on both teams believed at the time that they were closer than they had ever been to an agreement and that “given more time and a better political climate, a deal would have been reached.” Recently, more detailed information on the progress of the Taba summit has been published, including both Palestinian and Israeli negotiating documents and the “Moratinos Document” (the European Union’s internal summary). These bring both sides’ positions into better focus.

After agreeing that a just settlement of the refugee problem was central to any solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the two negotiating teams discussed five possible methods for implementing the internationally guaranteed rights of the Palestinian refugees. They would be allowed to return to their original homes in Israel, to territory swapped with Israel, or to a nascent Palestinian state. If they preferred, they could also choose to settle permanently in their host country or be repatriated to a third country. Each individual refugee would have the right to choose. The Israeli team suggested a cap on the number of refugees that Israel could absorb, at one point proposing a fifteen-year repatriation plan, with either 25,000 returning in the first three years or 40,000 over the first five years. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) negotiators were unwilling to accept anything under six figures. The Palestinian people would have accepted no less, while many Israeli commentators believe that even this miserly Israeli offer would have been too much for the Israeli public to stomach. There was agreement on the principle of compensating refugees for property losses, but no agreement on mechanisms or financing for doing so. An international commission was agreed upon, along with an eventual phasing out of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), but no agreement was reached on at what point all claims would be ended. Overall, substantial progress was made. Palestinian negotiators were principled and effective, while the presence of then-Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin on the Israeli side greatly contributed to a positive and fruitful atmosphere.

The Taba negotiations were suspended with the resounding electoral defeat of then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the entrance of the “Sharon-led coalition that is incapable or unwilling to make any reasonable offer on the refugee issue.” Some people doubt whether Barak would even have approved of the agreements that were shaping up in Taba, but with Sharon’s rise to power and the continued violence of the intifada, attitudes have significantly hardened on both sides and a compromise on the return of the refugees seems farther away than ever. Many Israeli Jews were frightened by protests by Palestinian citizens of Israel in the early months of the intifada, in sympathy with their compatriots in the Occupied Territories. To them it seemed that “Israel already had too many Palestinians” and the idea of absorbing more into the state became anathema. The intifada has also strengthened the position of those in Israel who call for a transfer of all Palestinians out of Israel and into neighboring countries in the name of “security.” With the upsurge of armed violence, many more people in Israel have lost faith in the idea of a Palestinian state with control over its own international borders, fearing a hostile neighbor able to arm itself without impediment.

A Palestinian state without this control would have “profound negative repercussions for the ability of Palestinians to repatriate to a future Palestinian state,” according to Brynen. And after 11 September, the number of third countries willing to accept a large number of Palestinian refugees for resettlement dropped precipitously.

In short, the options for solving the refugee problem have considerably narrowed in the year since the Taba summit. Leaders in the Palestinian community, such as Sari Nusseibeh and even Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasir Arafat himself, have attempted to signal constructive flexibility by recognizing Israel’s “demographic concern” regarding a massive influx of Palestinians. For this they have been harshly criticized by some Palestinian refugee groups, which have pressed for a maximalist right of return.

With this kind of political climate in Israel and Palestine, Brynen believes that when negotiations resume “the debate ought to be how best to achieve the maximum possible rights” of the refugees. He noted that, given the impossibility that Israel would ever agree to a full and unrestricted right of return under any set of circumstances, unrealistic rhetorical emphasis on maximalist goals served only to mislead refugees and strengthen right-wing views in Israel.

Overall, he expressed pessimism about the current situation, doubting that meaningful political negotiations would occur within the next few years.

The above text is based on remarks delivered on 22 February 2002 by Rex Brynen. The speakers’ views do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine or The Jerusalem Fund. This “For the Record” may be used without permission but with proper attribution to Palestine Center.

This information first appeared in “For the Record” No. 102, 25 February 2002.