“Reconcilable Differences: The PLO Plan for Peace with Israel.”
Report from a Palestine Center briefing by Diana Buttu and Michael Tarazi

On 3 February 2002, the New York Times published an opinion piece entitled “The Palestinian Vision of Peace.” In it, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat described the Palestinian position on the conditions for an effective and lasting peace. According to Arafat, “The Palestinian vision of peace is an independent and viable Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, living as an equal neighbor alongside Israel with peace and security for both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. In 1988, … [t]he Palestinians recognized Israel’s right to exist on 78 percent of historic Palestine with the understanding that we would be allowed to live in freedom on the remaining 22 percent under Israeli occupation since 1967. Our commitment to that two state solution remains unchanged, but unfortunately, also remains unreciprocated.”

At a Palestine Center (Palestine Center) briefing on 12 February, two legal advisors from the Negotiations Support Unit of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) Negotiations Affairs Department discussed the Palestinian vision for peace as outlined by Arafat, and surveyed creative solutions to seemingly intractable problems. Diana Buttu, editor of the Palestinian Yearbook of International Law and a member of the Ottawa Bar, advises the Palestinian peace negotiation team on the rights of refugees. Michael Tarazi, former European General Counsel of Euronet Services, Inc. and a member of the New York State Bar, provides legal and communications assistance to the team.

Diana Buttu began by addressing the “perception that there is no way out of the current crisis.” The impression has been given in both the United States and Israel that there is no way forward because the Palestinians are locked in a cycle of violence. Buttu’s assessment of the situation is that “we are trying to address an inherently political problem by trying to focus on security measures on the ground that can be taken in order to get out of the current intifada.”

Buttu pointed out that the Mitchell Report stated that there is “a very strong link, between political developments and Israel’s security, and that you cannot address Israel’s security without first addressing political issues on the ground.” In the implementation, however, the focus has remained pinned on security issues, at the expense of the development and resolution of a political solution. “We have taken ourselves down this path where we only view security as the issue,” observed Buttu. “What is being ignored now is that there is a political situation underlying all of the developments that are taking place on the ground.”

“What got us into this situation is not security,” noted Buttu, “and what will get us out of this situation is not security.” The central issue was, and remains, “the lack of progress on the ground.” While negotiations were taking place at governmental levels, the Palestinian people were not seeing any of the effects of those negotiations in their own lives. The way forward requires a reconciliation of what the Palestinians want to achieve politically with what Israel requires in terms of security.

“There are things that can be done on the ground, such as lifting the closures, ending the siege, ending extra-judicial executions and assassinations,” Buttu stated. These are “things that will not cost Israel anything, but will for the Palestinians make their lives much better, so we can create a situation where security measures can be addressed effectively.”

Buttu contends that “for America to be able to move forward as an honest broker in the region, it is going to have to recognize that Palestinian lives are just as worthy as Israeli lives. And that measures have to be put in place on the ground so as to be able to effect both political and security measures.”

Michael Tarazi observed that “various components of the final peace agreement—such as refugees, such as Jerusalem, such as borders—are seen as intractable problems, but are in fact solvable. We can reconcile the interests of these very big issues.” Tarazi went on to clarify these issues and creative approaches to each.

While there is much discussion regarding whether or not the Palestinians had abandoned the hope of a return to the 1967 borders, Tarazi stated that “we have not yet been presented with a reason to give up the 1967 borders, even with respect to Jerusalem.” In answer to the Israeli argument that it is impossible to move the settlers back into Israel and, hence, the settlements must be annexed, Tarazi observed that there are other options. “Perhaps they don’t have to go back. What’s wrong with Jewish citizens of Palestine?” Other options include having the Israeli government reabsorb the settlers through a five-year transitional period, allowing the settlers time to make a decision as to where they choose to live, and offering them incentives to return to Israel.

Taking the same approach to the issue of Jerusalem, Tarazi referred to Arafat’s description of Jerusalem, in the New York Times, as “one open city and as the capital of two states, Palestine and Israel.” A novel approach to creating this open city relies on the construction of a beltway around Jerusalem, providing “free access to everyone, both the Western and Eastern sectors of the city,” with a passport required in order to leave the city. Tarazi described two options for sovereignty over Jerusalem: sovereignty could be divided along the Green Line, or there could be joint sovereignty over the entire city.

The most controversial issue remains the status of the Palestinian refugees. “It has long been presented in Israel that É four million people move back in tomorrow … or there are no Palestinians returning to Israel.” Tarazi believes there are other options. A sustainable solution can be reached by giving refugees a choice, but if they believe that they “are being ignored, you may have a peace agreement, but you will not have peace.” Tarazi outlined four options that allow refugees to choose: return to Palestine, the Palestinian state can normalize the status of refugees in other countries, third-party resettlement, or return to Israel. While each option possesses both advantages and disadvantages, the strength of such a plan is that it would allow individuals to have some control over their own futures by making their own decisions.

Tarazi concluded stating that there is reason for hope. “There are possibilities, there are options of reconciling what is often presented as irreconcilable.”

The above text is based on remarks delivered on 12 February 2002 by Diana Buttu and Michael Tarazi. The speakers’ views do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine or The Jerusalem Fund. This “For the Record” may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine.

This information first appeared in “For the Record” No. 100, 13 February 2002.