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“A Return to the 4
June 1967 Borders: Critical for Peace.”
After decades of confrontation with Israel, the Palestinians agreed to accept the 22 percent of Mandate Palestine occupied by Israel in 1967 for their state, said Faisal Husseini at a September 13 Palestine Center luncheon, even though this was a major concession. Husseini, the principal official of the Palestinian Authority in Jerusalem, explained that the Palestinians “reached the conclusion that if we go on asking for [our] full historical [and] national rights, we [would be unable to] end our conflict with the Israelis,” and so were willing to compromise. Yet now, Israel refuses to return even this small percentage to the Palestinians. Husseini focused primarily on Jerusalem, but also provided a brief background of the evolving Palestinian position. Prior to Israel’s creation in 1948, the Palestinians struggled “against the British Mandate for the liberty of our land and for independence,” as well as against Zionist militias for “the unity of Palestine and Jerusalem.” After some 800,000 Palestinians were forced out of their homes and land in what is today Israel, “we faced a new reality,” said Husseini. “We became not a people who [were] defending or struggling for the independence of their state, but refugees who [were] trying to return back to their land, back to their capital.” However, in 1988, the Palestinian leadership accepted a two-state solution and a capital consisting of only East Jerusalem, even though “70 percent of all properties” in West Jerusalem belonged to Palestinians. In addition, who can argue, asked Husseini, that the Arab villages and cities in Israel—Jaffa, Acre, Deir Yassin, Ein Karem—are not Palestinian? Yet on the other hand, he continued, Israelis “will [also] tell us, who can deny our history and [can say] that Judea and Samaria [are] not part of our history?” Having two states divided by the 1967 borders is “not the Palestinian dream” nor “the Israeli dream,” yet “we [wanted] to end this conflict between us and the Israelis,” and concessions were needed to do so. Yet Israel will not accept the 4 June 1967 borders. This is the case even though the Oslo process is based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 which calls for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. Israel instead takes the approach that “whatever is mine is mine, and whatever is yours is yours and mine.” In other words, Israel insists on controlling territory in which Israelis live, yet where Palestinians reside is up for debate. For example, although the Oslo agreements refer to Jerusalem—not East Jerusalem—as one of the final status issues, “the Israelis are trying to [make] only East Jerusalem … a subject for negotiations, and a subject for concessions and compromise.” However, Husseini argued, negotiations must start with “the position that everything … west of [the 1967] borders is under … Israeli sovereignty, and everything in the eastern side is under … Palestinian sovereignty.” If Israel accepts these terms, “then we are ready to discuss all the problems that [may] be created because of these borders.” Whether the concerns relate to security, social issues, property, villages, or other matters, “we are ready to discuss [them] openly.” The Palestinians insist on sovereignty over East Jerusalem, but Husseini emphasized that they do not want a wall between the two sides. “Our position is to have Jerusalem [as] two capitals in one open” city. If the Palestinians have control over East Jerusalem, they are willing to address the Israelis’ concerns about the area under the Al-Aqsa mosque, as well as the Jewish quarter of the Old City, the “wailing wall,” and so on, “because we don’t want to hurt the other side.” The Palestinians are willing to discuss the thornier issues, but “any solution must be a balanced solution … We are ready [to swap] land,” but it must be land of equal value. “[T]o tell me that as a price for the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, [Israel] will” return to the Palestinians the eastern suburbs—and call them Jerusalem—“is not acceptable.” In addition, if the Israeli locations in the east are under Israeli sovereignty, said Husseini, then the areas where Palestinians live in the west should be under Palestinian sovereignty. If limited Palestinian sovereignty in West Jerusalem is unacceptable to the Israeli negotiators, then how can they expect the Palestinians to agree to it in the east? Husseini strongly emphasized Jerusalem’s historical importance to Palestinians. For “at least for the last 15 centuries, Jerusalem was the most important [city] in this area,” said Husseini. At the beginning of the 1900s, the Palestinians viewed Jerusalem as their religious, social, and economic capital. Even now, “from a geographical point of view, [East Jerusalem] is linked with the other Palestinian areas.” The Palestinians also have a larger population and own more property in the Old City than Israelis. Israeli statistics show that there are 29,000 Palestinians (37,000 according to Palestinian numbers) and only 2,900 Israelis in the Old City. Moreover, Palestinians control 89-90 percent of the property there, contended Husseini. Despite repeated attempts by the Israeli authorities to change the demographics of Jerusalem in Israel’s favor, the “number of Palestinians became [greater]. They started returning … to Jerusalem, trying to live anywhere. They started with renewing the old houses in the Old City, even the caves.” In addition, they “started to build [with] or without permission.” Yet the Israeli negotiators continue to offer proposals that would cut Jerusalem into a few different sections and persist in “dividing the West Bank into several islands”—each area with its own conditions. This approach would destroy “any idea of a Palestinian state in the future” and therefore the idea of two states that could “communicate with each other to face the challenges” that will come later. “If we want [an agreement] to last, we mustn’t take into consideration only the next five or ten or 15 or 20 years, but we must think [beyond] that.”
The above text is based on remarks delivered on 13 September 2000 by Faisal Husseini the principal official of the Palestinian Authority in Jerusalem. His views do not necessarily reflect those of the Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund. This “For the Record” was written by Wendy Lehman; it may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine. This information first appeared in For The Record No. 50, 18 September 2000. |
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