“Palestinian Refugees and the Permanent Status Negotiations,”
by Salman Abu-Sitta

 

Creation of the Refugee Crisis:

16 November 1999—In 1948, 85 percent of the Palestinians who lived in the part of Palestine that became Israel were driven out of their homes by Jewish forces. Most lived in 531 towns and villages that are now depopulated; their land, which was seized by Israel, now constitutes 92 percent of Israel. These Palestinians sought refuge in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (21 percent of “historic” Palestine under the former British Mandate; both areas subsequently were occupied by Israel in the 1967 war), as well as in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and other countries.

Today there are 4.9 million refugees, of whom 3.6 million are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). About one-third live in the West Bank and Gaza, slightly more than one-third in Jordan, and 17 percent in Syria and Lebanon. Thus, 85 percent of the refugees reside in and around historic Palestine, while 15 percent are equally spread between other Arab countries and the West. All these figures exclude another 58,000 internal refugees (who, along with their descendants now number 250,000) who were forceably relocated elsewhere in Israel and whose land was confiscated.


International Law:

In December 1948, the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 194, which calls for the return of the refugees to their homes and for compensation for those who suffered damages. The same resolution created a “Conciliation Commission” to facilitate their return and a relief agency (UNRWA) to provide necessary assistance until their return. Opposed only by Israel (and by the U.S. since 1994), the UN has affirmed this resolution 110 times in the last 50 years by an overwhelming majority. In 1974, the UN classified the right of return as an “inalienable right.” The UN, and particularly the Security Council, has supported the right of return around the world by diplomacy (in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, Namibia, and Cyprus) and sometimes by force (Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor).

The right of return is also affirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and many regional human rights treaties. The right derives its strength from the sanctity of private property ownership, which cannot be extinguished by sovereignty or occupation and is a natural corollary of the principle of self-determination.


The Palestinian Position:

All schemes to settle the refugees anywhere except in their homes have failed because Palestinians have fiercely resisted permanent resettlement, which they view as a form of “ethnic cleansing” and as a denial of their basic human rights. Palestinian public opinion on the subject is clear: A poll taken by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in September 1999 indicates that 90.8 percent of Palestinian refugees oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state as a price for sacrificing the right of return. Yet many Palestinians fear that, given the enormous imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, PA President Yasser Arafat will do just that. Even if one percent of the refugees actively oppose permanent resettlement, those 50,000 refugees represent a number large enough to threaten the stability of any government.


Israel’s Position:

In order to gain U.S. support for its admission to the UN, Israel agreed in 1949 to accept UN resolutions on Palestine, including Resolution 194. In the same year, President Harry Truman demanded the return of at least one-third (300,000) of the Palestinian refugees—the inhabitants of the area Israel occupied in excess of the UN partition plan. Israel agreed to allow the return of 100,000 refugees (by natural increase now numbering 650,000).

Yet after its admission to the UN, Israel allowed only a token number to return under a family reunification program. Israel has also reneged on its agreement to annually approve 1,200 applications for return to the West Bank and 800 to Gaza during the “interim” period described in the September 1993 Declaration of Principles. It has failed to meet this quota in any one year since then. Israel has argued that the country is already overcrowded, that the refugees’ villages are largely destroyed, that the boundaries are unclear, and that the return of the refugees will dilute the Jewish character of Israel.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak has clearly stated his absolute opposition to the return of any refugees to Israel. This opposition is one of the famous “no’s” he articulated during his election campaign in May 1999 and is a position that he has frequently restated since then. Moreover, in a move to foreclose discussion about the return and compensation of refugees, Barak has insisted that the permanent status negotiations end, once and for all, any future claims that the Palestinians may want to make.


Finding a Solution:

The location and extent of the refugees’ land and property has been well-documented by the UN, which maintains an archive on behalf of 500,000 refugee landowners. Maps of the British Mandate clearly indicate all town and village lands. The Israel Lands Administration, which now leases refugees’ land to Jewish kibbutzim and moshavim, has this information readily available. Simply put, the extent of Jewish-owned land in historic Palestine (1,682 square kilometers or eight percent of Israel) is well-defined in Jewish and British records. The rest—92 percent of Israel—was confiscated from Palestinians.

Presently, 78 percent of Israel’s Jewish population lives in only 15 percent of Israel. Most of the remaining Jews live in one or two dozen urban centers, originally Palestinian cities. This leaves only 154,000 rural Jews in control of over 17,000 square kilometers comprised of the land and homes expropriated from refugees, now numbering 4.9 million. The demands of two politically volatile groups of refugees—those currently living in Lebanon and Gaza—could be met through resettlement without upsetting the demographic balance inside Israel.


There are six districts in Israel:

Central, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Northern, Southern, and Jerusalem. If the 362,000 registered refugees in Lebanon returned to their homes mostly in Israel’s Galilee region, which is still largely Arab, the percentage of the Jewish population in the “center” (that is the Central, Tel Aviv, and Haifa districts—where 80 percent of Israeli Jews live) would decline by only one percent. If the 759,000 registered refugees in Gaza returned to their homes mostly in the Southern district, the percentage of the Jewish population in the “center” would decline by only six percent, from 90 to 84 percent. Jews would remain the majority population in all other areas of Israel.

Israel’s argument that it is already overcrowded is undermined by its own “Law of Return,” by which Israel freely admits Jewish immigrants. In the 1990s alone, Israel welcomed Russian immigrants equal in number to the total number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Gaza. If Israel is serious about its own argument that the country is already overcrowded, then it should reconsider its current immigration policies.


Key Recommendations:

Should Barak’s vision prevail, the current “permanent status” negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization are unlikely to lead to a just or lasting solution of the refugee problem. Accordingly,

  1. The U.S. government, which describes itself as an “honest broker” to the peace process, should take into account the refugees’ human rights and the international consensus regarding their right to return. The U.S. should not accept Barak’s unilateral dismissal of the Palestinian refugees’ claims and should consider Palestinians’ right of return to Israel to be a serious issue for discussion and negotiation.
  2. In the context of the permanent status negotiations, the potential of the Galilee (in northern Israel) and the Negev (in the south) to receive refugees should be given full consideration.

 

Dr. Salman Abu-Sitta, an independent researcher and frequent author on Palestinian refugee affairs, lives in Kuwait. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine. This Policy Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund.

This information first appeared in Policy Brief No. 7, 16 November 1999.